

ATTITUDE TO IDEOLOGY IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF THE XXI CENTURY: AT THE CROSSROADS - THE INEVITABILITY OF CHOOSING YOUR OWN PATH

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Abstract

In the transition of the world from the twentieth century to the XXI ideology was unfairly rejected by most countries of the world. The distancing from ideologies occurred as a result of the events that followed the dismantling of the Soviet Union. The withdrawal from the world arena of the USSR also meant the withdrawal from the world stage of communist ideology and a landslide weakening of the importance of other ideologies.

The de-ideologization of the world turned out to be destructive in the sense that international relations lost stability and led to an increase in global tension. It can be said that ideologies have consolidated their fragments of society and stabilized the relationship between them.

Currently, the world is facing a dilemma: either to continue the disorderly movement in the deideologized world, or countries to acquire their own ideology, understandable to themselves and neighbors and the world as a whole, which would undoubtedly lead to more understandable bilateral and multilateral relations in the world.

Keywords

communist ideology, de-ideologization, practice of liberalism.

1. Introduction

The current situation in the world is characterized by uncertainty and unpredictability of further development. There is a confrontation of two trends. One of them is the preservation of the existing forces after the collapse of the international bipolar system in 1991. Another is the tendency to strengthen the formation of a new world order.

Externally, this confrontation looks like a confrontation between Russia and the United States, as well as a confrontation between China and the United States.

In reality, most of the countries of the world that have the potential necessary to conduct an independent policy are practically involved in the confrontation.

In these conditions, it becomes necessary for all countries to choose guidelines for building their national policies in an unstable and changing world. Ideology looks like a proven support, meaning the construction of a model of national ideology by countries. A model that could guarantee countries the preservation of their own identity, understandable both for the population and for the outside world, bearing in mind international relations.

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2. Main part

In the first quarter of the XXI century, the issues of ideology seem to many an anachronism in the sense that ideology has lost its meaning after the world has emerged from ideological bipolarity, that is, when the need to decide whether you belong to the world of capital or the world of socialism has disappeared.

This approach was set by the famous American researcher Francis Fukuyama, announcing the "end" of history in his book "The End of History and the Last Man" (The End of History and the Last Man), published in 1992 (Fukuyama, 2022). He proposed to consider the collapse of the USSR as a consequence of the spread of the theory and practice of liberalism, which, in his opinion, crowns the development of ideology in the world.

F. Fukuyama resorts to the image of the "end" of history in the sense that further possible research in the field of ideologies seems to him hopeless, since liberalism, according to his version, proved that it represents the crown of the development of world ideology. Summarizing his arguments, F. Fukuyama calls for a universal appeal to the theory and practice of liberalism.

The thesis of the "end" of history undoubtedly reflected the euphoria prevailing in the community of Western countries after the withdrawal of the USSR from the international arena. The thesis was impressive in its aphorism, sounded like an informal announcement of the victory of one of the sides in the bipolar confrontation in the world, which was observed from 1917 to 1991.

Indeed, the ideology of communism as the antipode of liberalism quickly lost its former popularity after the collapse of the world socialist system. Nevertheless, the thesis of the "end" of history claimed more – to replace not only communism, but all other ideologies, even those that were considered allies of liberalism, for example, conservatism.

The task initially seemed unbearable and unacceptable for the bearers of other international ideologies. As a result, liberalism unexpectedly fell into isolation and its thesis of the "end" of history did not take root. The formal recognition of the miscalculation to introduce the "end" of history into political circulation was that the book by F. Fukuyama has not been reprinted and the publishing house that released the book is THE FREE PRESS A Division of Macmillan, Inc. NEW YORK lost its independence (1994) (Fukuyama, 1994) and passed to another owner and then abandoned its name.

However, in the post-Soviet space, the thesis of F. Fukuyama served as a kind of vaccination against mentioning the concept of ideology at all. Most politicians in the states of the former socialist system openly shunned and even shied away from proposals for the use of one or another ideology in building the domestic and foreign policy course of their countries. This situation was also caused by the fact that in the post-Soviet and former socialist countries, the generation that grew up in the conditions of communist ideology and often nostalgic for the times of the USSR is alive and influences public sentiment. Accordingly, their opponents, when it comes to ideology, suggest that the ideology may most likely turn out to be communist.

The effect of these factors leads to the fact that an ideological vacuum has developed in the post-Soviet countries, which is unnatural to public life.

Against this background and due to unfavorable historical and economic circumstances, radical politicians and radical forces are becoming more active. Especially visible and large-scale manifestations of radicalism became in the years of the pandemic

(13.03.2020-05.05.2023), during economic downturns (2007-2018), during international crises, in particular, Ukrainian (2014- current moment).

Often, radicals take the ideas of liberalism as slogans or disguise themselves as supporters of liberalism, which devalues liberalism and causes its rejection in the public consciousness. The real bearers of liberalism do not realize that their indirect and sometimes direct solidarity with the radicals

Hardly F. Fukuyama and his supporters thought about such an unsightly refraction of the ideas of liberalism, proclaimed and promoted the thesis of the "end" of history. Apparently they idealized or did not deeply know the practical world around them. At the moment, F. Fukuyama and his adherents have acquired a household name. Their efforts have produced the opposite result to what they seem to have hoped for – to supply the world with an effective ideology and eliminate those ideologies that seemed to them distracting from the true path.

The misconception lies in the fact that an ideological procrustean bed has been artificially arranged, which, as is known, served to shorten the "long" and stretch the "short" ones. It is noteworthy that according to legend, the standard – procrustean bed had an adjustable character both in terms of length and in terms of other scales – it could be controlled.

The problem is seen in the fact that the supporters of the thesis "the end" of history cannot or do not want to admit their error and do not make efforts to correct their thesis.

Distancing from ideology, in particular, in the post-socialist space is of a created nature, artificially created and artificially maintained.

Currently, a number of factors affect public consciousness in most countries.

One is that the communist ideology really self-destructed after the dismantling of the USSR and the collapse of the socialist system. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the communist ideology has not disappeared, but has only lost the status of one of the dominant ideologies in the world. However, the bearers of the communist ideology are preserved, grouped into left-wing parties and left-wing public organizations, albeit under different names, but with the same content. It is noteworthy that such parties enjoy support, as evidenced by the indicators of elections – parliamentary, presidential, local, in which supporters of post-communism receive an average of 5-10% of the vote. The figures are small, but we must not overlook them, there is a specific part of the population and it would not be rational to ignore it in building domestic policy.

Another factor is the claims of supporters and adherents of liberalism to recognize liberal ideology as universal and perfect and as if it absorbed the best achievements of philosophical thought and public–state practice. Claims to the scientific perfection of liberalism do not find a valid justification in the formation of ideology in the world. Thus, the French figure Antoine Louis Claude Destute de Tracy, recognized as the founder of ideology as a scientific discipline, thought of ideology not as a dogma, but as a means of social development. Moreover, in his fundamental work *Elements D'ideologie*, he emphasized that ideology will evolve as mental abilities develop (Destut de Tracy, 2018).

It is also noteworthy that he addresses his book and the very creation of ideology to young people in the calculation and hope that they will improve the ideology in relation to new phenomena in the world. The flaw of the adherents of liberalism can also be seen in the fact that they carry out the dissemination of their ideology and its introduction into the life of society with the use of force, including military force. The most striking example is the phenomenon of the "Arab Spring". In addition, such clumsy practice leads

to the fact that liberalism and the so-called "color" revolutions acquire the form of synonyms in the public consciousness (Destut de Tracy, 2018).

The third factor manifests itself in the fact that the countries of the post-Soviet and post-socialist space continue to develop, a new generation is gradually coming to power, which is not burdened with either communist or liberal ideology, does not consider itself obliged to support them and even more so to implement them. With an objective view of the situation, in particular, the example of the post-Soviet states, it should be recognized that the process of their state formation has taken place. Modern local elites have developed.

This development was unexpected for the "winners" in the Cold War. They assumed that the dismantling of the Soviet Union would lead to an increase in centrifugal forces for the former Soviet republics to the point that they would turn into a counterweight for Russia. Their calculation was justified only in relation to the Baltic states and Ukraine. The rest of the Soviet republics took a balanced position. Apparently not looking at the prospects of radically changing this course of things, supporters of liberalism began to promote the idea of joint management of the post-Soviet space with Russia. The development of the main provisions of the idea was undertaken by the American Rand Corporation and the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Their joint project of collective management of the post-Soviet space was launched by them into political circulation in 1920, but did not find broad support in the post-Soviet space (Shapiro, 2019).

The confrontation of the three listed factors leads to the fact that politicians and figures relying on radicalism are beginning to gain popularity. They appear in various manifestations, mainly in the form of nationalism, xenophobia, legal nihilism, intolerance towards other people, the emergence of exotic currents. For example, the current of Black Lives matter, whose supporters demand its recognition even where the topic of racism has never existed.

The danger of Russophobia should be taken into account. Several vectors of Russophobia are being viewed.

The internal vector is generated mainly by politicians and public figures who do not have deep competencies, but put forward extensive ambitions. They believe that the field of Russophobia provides them with opportunities to systematically be politically active and remind themselves of themselves, without making efforts to present concrete achievements in state and public life to society. Such politicians often turn to history, which they interpret in an anti-Russian spirit, exposing themselves as "defenders" from Russian "aggressiveness". As a rule, they tend to focus on individual historical facts. They choose several facts in which they feel more or less confident.

Politicians belonging to the described category show themselves to be the most consistent Russophobes. They strongly oppose the normalization of relations with Russia, rejecting even the practical benefits of normalization for their country. Their behavior is explained by the fact that their political reputation is based on the opposition to Russia. Normalization of relations with Russia leads to their political devaluation and a decline in their relevance in the life of society.

Another vector of Russophobia is the introduction of Russophobia from outside. Often the bearers of external Russophobia are emigrants born and raised in other countries. Naturally, they are the products of their foreign upbringing, education and life experience. It is logical that they want to preserve what they have re-emigrated with and therefore they openly or indirectly reject or squeeze out of public life everything that does

not coincide with the vision of life instilled in them. There is also a category of people who readily respond to any ideas brought from outside. It seems to them that imported ideas can bring their life closer to the patterns that they borrow and which they think are effective. They undertake to act as conductors of such ideas, including Russophobia. They do this for various reasons. Someone is convinced, someone is selfish, someone is for the company, someone is not fully aware of himself. There is a kind of competition between both categories of externally oriented Russophobes. Russophobes from among the emigrants consider themselves superior and better understand the essence of anti-Russian rhetoric and anti-Russian actions. They strive to be at the forefront. Russophobes – neophytes are wary of emigrants, realizing that if they consolidate in power, they will push back Russophobes-neophytes and create difficulties for them. Nevertheless, both categories of externally oriented Russophobes enjoy the direct and indirect support of those countries that would like to replace Russia in bilateral relations.

In a broader sense, the current development of the situation in the world shows that, despite overcoming the bipolar ideological division, the desire to group and even more so to group against each other, has not lost its relevance, but on the contrary, it is becoming acute and at the same time frightening in the sense that it can lead to a global military shock.

Against this background, politicians who care about the benefits of their state and their population should certainly think about how to consolidate the population, how to consolidate the population as a social force, how to consolidate the economic and political potential of society and the state.

We can safely say that no other means has been invented yet or no other tool has been proposed other than ideology.

In these conditions, distancing from the very concept of ideology becomes a serious obstacle to the necessary consolidation of society and the state.

Ideological uncertainty leads to uncertainty of the further development of the state, uncertainty of public sentiment, complicates the formation of new national elites. Figuratively speaking, states, societies and elites have to look for ways to improve and adapt to the current ideological patterns (Schwarmantel, 2009).

The responsibility falls without any doubt on the local elites, regardless of whether they are in power, whether they are opponents or are preparing to take power.

In addition to socio-economic programs, political elites should think about how to encourage the population to implement these programs, since the stability of elites and accordingly, the stability of states depend on the implementation of programs.

In other words, the elites need or should, without delay, take up the formation of the development of the ideology of the national or state as they like.

There may be several options.

You can follow the path of least resistance - just accept the option that adherents of the ideology of liberalism persistently offer. The difficulties on this path are obvious. Liberalism, by virtue of its "universality", will require serious expenditure of effort, energy and finance for its proper adaptation to local conditions, an adaptation that would make liberalism effective in specific conditions to such an extent that it protects people and not protected from people, as it currently prevails.

You can take up the ideology of nationalism. It is also quite accessible and at the first stage it seems effective for supporting the elites, but in the future sooner or later you will have to face a situation that is associated with a person trying to use a knife by holding it by the blade.

Both options are easily perceived and cause temptation to turn to them.

Experienced politicians shy away from turning to both the first option and the second option.

Of course, you can still follow the path called the ostrich, meaning to hide or hide your head from ideological challenges and give free rein to events, let them take their course.

This way is no less dangerous than the previous two. It is not beneficial for the figures themselves, who can turn to such tactics, because they will become the conduits of the situation that will sweep them away. It is dangerous for the state because it disorients the population by itself and does not give an idea of what spiritual or political guidelines should be based on or to which to strive.

The most difficult, but also the most effective way is to work on your own state ideology.

It is difficult because it is necessary to find and ensure the continuity of the previous historical development, neither denying it nor shutting it off. A difficult task, but worthy, which allows us to preserve the unity of all generations of the population, endowing each of them with its own value and its own pride.

Continuity is important not only as a tool for social cohesion. It is appropriate to talk about spiritual continuity. Immersion in the history of the spiritual life of the state, society and their individual associations will undoubtedly be useful for identifying approaches to what is currently called ideology in the past. Reflections and past practice on what should form the basis of a particular state show how much these issues concern the population, how they reacted to them and how they are reacting now. Studying the experience of the past will provide an opportunity to avoid ideological inconsistencies, not to repeat previously made mistakes, to try to combine the past and the present in synthesis, to pave the way for the future, relying on a conscientious study of the spiritual potential of society.

It is necessary to outline or clarify the prospect that the state will not move to another place, the location will be in the same place and it will need to solve the issues of geographical neighborhood as I did before.

Accordingly, the ideology can be called a doctrine should take into account and assume specific mechanisms, specific options for bilateral balanced relations that allow the state population to develop freely and productively.

It should be noted here that there is a widespread lack of understanding of the essence of ideology in specific societies and at a specific time.

One explanation may be that, in addition to unfavorable conditions for ideology, the subject of ideology itself turned out to be beyond use and beyond knowledge.

It seems that most people avoid writing or referring to ideology or expressing their opinion about ideology due to the fact that they do not own the subject of ideology.

Researchers, politicians, experts do not show deep knowledge of ideology and therefore either bypass it or reject it as a factor of public and political life in the narrow and broad senses of the word.

The topic of ideology requires attention and attention should begin with accurately and correctly identifying the subject of what ideology is and what kind of burden it carries in society.

It should be recognized that ideology acts as the unifying core of the socio-political life of any society on any scale: social groups of corporations, parties, associations, society as a whole.

The confirmation appears in the fact that any public associations, especially political parties, on the eve of various kinds of elections, as a rule, emphasize in their programs provisions containing ideological motives or pointing to ideological guidelines.

However, in the post-election period, in everyday life or in everyday practice, programs, in most cases, remain unfulfilled, especially in terms of ideological content. This situation is due to the fact that politicians and public figures, although they strive for noble guidelines and are imbued with noble intentions, but do not bother to develop mechanisms for the implementation of their programs and above all, in terms of the ideological motivation of their activities.

In other words, it was difficult and remains difficult to achieve such an implementation. The task seems to be to find such a practical embodiment of the ideology embedded in the programs, when ideology becomes unobtrusive, not burdensome, but an ordinary part of society's life.

It would be biased to consider Russophobes as separate local elites. Russophobes are groups in different elites. They try to influence the activities of the elites, and the elites themselves use them if necessary in different situations.

What does a successful ideology consist of? It is accepted and becomes effective when the peculiarities of the local mentality are creatively included in it, when self-identity is clearly drawn, when territorial and historical traditions are taken into account, when the positioning of oneself in the world is competently carried out, when the prospects for the future are outlined.

From here it becomes clear that it is easier to build your own ideology than to borrow from the outside, especially the "universal" one!

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